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Abstract. This article presents a novel intruder model for automated
reasoning about anonymity (vote-privacy) and secrecy properties of vot-
ing systems. We adapt the lazy spy for this purpose, as it avoids the
eagerness of pre-computation of unnecessary deductions, reducing the
required state space for the analysis. This powerful intruder behaves as
a Dolev-Yao intruder, which not only observes a protocol run, but also
interacts with the protocol participants, overhears communication chan-
nels, intercepts and spoofs any messages that he has learned or generated
from any prior knowledge.
We make several important modifications in relation to existing channel
types and the deductive system. For the former, we define various channel
types for different threat models. For the latter, we construct a large
deductive system over the space of messages transmitted in the voting
system model. The model represents the first formal treatment of the
vVote system, which was used in November 2014, in state elections in
Victoria, Australia.
Keywords: Lazy spy; Dolev-Yao; Voting Systems; Model Checking; CSP;
FDR
1 Introduction
This article 3 presents a novel intruder model for automated reasoning about
anonymity and secrecy properties of voting systems. It is much stronger than
the passive attacker used in previous work in [MHS14, MHS15], as it behaves as
a Dolev-Yao intruder [DY83]. This type of intruder not only observes a protocol
run, but also interacts with the protocol participants, overhears communication
channels, intercepts and spoofs any messages that he has learned or inferred from
previous knowledge. This approach is inspired by lazy spy (perfect spy) [RG97],
3 This article extends a previous version appeared in the Proceedings of the 13th
International Workshop on Automated Verification of Critical Systems (AVOCS
2013).
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which is designed for cryptographic protocol analysis, and called ‘lazy’ as it
avoids the eagerness of pre-computation of unnecessary inferences. To apply this
intruder model to voting systems, several important modifications are needed in
relation to existing channel types and the deductive system. For the former, we
benefit from Creese et al. [CGH+05, CGRZ03], who defined various channels for
different threat models in ubiquitous computing environments. For the latter,
we construct a larger deductive system over the space of messages transmitted
in the model.
The basis for our model is the vVote voting system, which is based on Preˆt
a` Voter (‘PaV’) [Rya04], and developed for use in Victorian Electoral Commis-
sion (VEC) elections during early voting phase in November 2014 [BCH+12a,
BCH+12b, Cul13] in Victoria, Australia. In the elections, there were 40 legisla-
tive council representatives and 88 districts in 8 regions, and a mixture of the
alternative vote4 (AV), and the single transferable vote (STV) in order to rank
these candidates. In total, 1121 votes were cast using vVote voting system. Most
of the key features of PaV are retained in the vVote system. However, to adapt
the system to such a complex election setup, a number of modifications have
been necessary in the system design; for instance, the inclusion of distributed
ballot generation, an electronic ballot marker (EBM) to assist the voter in filling
out the ballot, and print-on-demand ballots for voters who are voting away from
their registered polling station.
In the literature, there has to date been no successful automated anonymity
verification of voting systems using the Dolev-Yao intruder model. For exam-
ple, Backes et al. [BHM08] analysed voting systems mechanically in terms of
verifiability properties. However, no automated analysis of anonymity property
was provided as the ProVerif tool employed was unable to cope with algebraic
equivalences, and hence, only a hand proof was given. Similarly, Delaune et
al. [DKR10, DRS08] and Smyth [Smy11] verified vote privacy of the FOO vot-
ing system [FOO92] with an additional compiler (ProSwapper), but these lacked
a proof of its soundness—we understand this to mean that the framework may
produce false negatives. However, the ProVerif verification tool is capable of
evaluating reachability properties of security protocols for an unbounded num-
ber of sessions using observational equivalence. Chadha et al. [CCK12] managed
to verify the anonymity of the FOO voting system using a prototype, Active
Knowledge in Security Protocols (AKISS), which was written in the OCaml pro-
gramming language and implemented to check equivalences; however, the tool
used was inefficient, and an important part of the analysis, the termination of
the saturation procedure as required for deciding trace equivalences, was merely
conjectured rather than proven. AVISPA [ABB+05] is another tool providing a
support for the evaluations of reachability properties of security protocols for an
unbounded number of sessions with TA4SL verification tool [BHKO04]. Lastly,
Cremers [Cre08a, Cre08b] proposes the Scyther tool that can evaluate reacha-
bility properties of security protocols for a bounded and unbounded number of
sessions. It does not guarantee the termination of unbounded session, but it pro-
4 also called instant-runoff voting (IRV)
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duces results for the bounded case. In our analysis, Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) formal language and Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR)
model checker is used, which supports automated analysis of security protocols
for bounded number of sessions. Although, no proof of soundness is given in
this article, what we get from this tool is that it guarantees the termination for
limited number of session and we do not get false negatives. In order to gener-
alise the verification to models of arbitrary size, there are several techniques in
the literature that can be employed, such as structural and data-independent
induction [Ros97, Ros10]. However, such techniques do not easily apply to the
models that have been developed here as the established results require rather
strict conditions, which have not been satisfied in the voting system model used
in this article.
This article presents a formal framework that is efficient in terms of cutting
down unnecessary states and flexible for usage with privacy-related property
analysis of voting systems under an active intruder model by adapting the lazy
spy. Additionally, in order to demonstrate the suitability of this intruder model
for evaluating voting systems, we model and analyse a real-world voting system
vVote that was employed on a large scale real election held in 2014.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
of the vVote voting system. In Section 4, the vVote voting system is modelled in
CSP and the lazy spy intruder model is further extended for the analysis of voting
systems. Section 5 analyses the vVote voting system model regarding the formal
specification of anonymity given in [MHS14], investigates the analysis of the
model under alternative assumptions, such as the presence of a corrupt election
authority and then proposes applicability of the framework in secrecy analysis of
voting systems automatically using FDR as the model checker. Section 6 presents
conclusions and discusses the findings.
2 vVote System Outline
Over the last few decades many trustworthy voting systems have been proposed.
However, only a few have been deployed in large-scale real elections. Regarding
these, Scantegrity II [CCC+08] was the first E2E voting system deployed in a
binding governmental election on November 3, 2009 [CCC+10], involving a rel-
atively small electorate with 1728 voters. Additionally, Norway used an internet
voting protocol [Gjø10] in the municipal elections in September 2011, in which
more than 25,000 voters cast their votes using this protocol. Moreover, STAR-
Vote [BBK+12] is another voter verifiable DRE-style voting system, which is
going to be used in Travis County, Texas, the United States, involving over
450,000 registered voters.
The vVote voting system is an end-to-end (E2E) paper-based electronic vot-
ing system based on Preˆt a` Voter [CRS05, Rya04]. However, a number of modifi-
cations have been made to the original Preˆt a` Voter system. The main difference
is that an electronic device is deployed in order to facilitate accommodating a
candidate list with over 30 candidates on the ballot forms. This also helps voters
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to indicate their preferences among many other candidates. However, deploying
these computers requires further trust on them as they know about the vot-
ers’ choice at the time of voting. Hence, a misbehaving device can violate voter
anonymity or vote privacy and as a result, for further confidence in the design
of this promising real-world voting system, formal verification is needed.
Figure 1 illustrates the vVote ballot form. On one side there is a randomly
permuted candidate list and a QR code at the bottom that records the permuted
candidate order, on the other are marking boxes, a unique serial number and
another QR code, corresponding to the onion that embeds the candidate order.
vVote gives the voters ability to verify if their vote has been included in the final
tally with a printed record of their vote. In the middle of the ballot, there is a
perforation line. Once the voter marks her choices in the vote boxes, she then
tears down the perforation line, keeps the half with a copy of the marked boxes
as receipt, signed by the system, and shreds the other half of her ballot with
the candidate order. As the candidate order is randomised and shredded, the
receipt with the mark on does not reveal how the voter voted. The cast ballots
are then made published on the Web Bulletin Board (WBB), allowing voters to
check whether their vote has been included in the final tally.
Figure 2 depicts the overview of vVote design including the main components,
some of which will be covered in the following paragraphs, such as, Print on
Demand (POD) Service, Distributed Ballot Generation and Mixnet Manager.
2.1 Voting Ceremony
Having registered with the poll worker, the voter or the former interacts with
the system to get a ballot paper. A printer will be deployed that derive the
permuted candidate list on the ballot form when it is actually being printed in
the polling station. On the printed vVote ballot form, there is a QR barcode
that consists of a digitally signed serial number. The association between the
candidate order and the serial number on the ballot should be kept secret. The
voter now can choose to audit her ballot form by checking the encrypted list
of candidates on the WBB matches the plaintext candidate order on the ballot
form. Once she is ready to vote, she scans the barcode on the ballot to the
EBM (a new front-end component where the voter can see and cast her ballot
form in an electronic environment). Once the voter completes marking on the
EBM, she gets her printed marked ballot form from the EBM. The voter now
should separate the candidate list from the ballot form and dispose it in order
to ensure receipt-freeness. The EBM interacts with the WBB to submit the vote
and receive a digitally signed receipt for it, which is then printed for the voter
for verification purposes by a receipt printer in the booth. The EBM submits
voter preferences and the QR code to the WBB. The WBB commits, records and
broadcasts the ballot data generated during the election and also signs the serial
numbers allocated by the ballot manager, thereby ensuring their uniqueness.
Once the voter has cast her vote and received her receipt signed by the WBB,
she then leaves the polling station.
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Check your preferences
online at
VEC.VIC.GOV.AU/WBB2014
Your code is:  NTH:1
Figure 1: A slip example—the front face
ballot. Instead, they are recorded on the WBB, and
there is a QR code on the LHS front face of the bal-
lot to refer to the corresponding onions. On the front
face of the ballot form, there is another QR code in
the RHS which records the permutation of the can-
didate ordering of the entire ballot. Each QR code
merely reproduces in machine-readable form exactly
the information that is available in human-readable
form on the same side of the ballot.
We now describe how the onions are constructed
in different sections of the ballot form. In this paper,
we use Eˆpk(m) to denote that m is encrypted using
exponential ElGamal, and Epk(m) denotes that m is
encrypted using normal ElGamal.
For the LA section, we use the Baudron counter
[CFSY96, BFP+01, BCH+12] to encode these onions
as follows: suppose there are k candidates in the LA
election, we first select a value M where M > k (e.g.
M = k+1). Then we associate M0 with the first can-
didate in the ballot draw order, M1 with the second
candidate, and so on. The onion for the i-th candi-
date will be encrypted using the exponential ElGamal
cipher as Eˆpk(M
i−1) = (gM
i−1
yr, gr). This allows us
to absorb all these onions as well as their associated
preferential rankings into a single ciphertext using
the homomorphic property. Hence it will speed up
the tallying process.
For the LC-ATL section, we simply select a
value in Gq to represent each party/group name,
and the onion is encrypted using the ElGamal
cipher Epk(m) = (my
r, gr). For example, if
α, β, γ are values in Gq to represent the parties
A,B, C respectively, their corresponding onions will
be Epk(α), Epk(β), Epk(γ).
For the LC-BTL section, we use the Baudron
counter again to encode the onions. Suppose there
are l candidates in the LC-BTL section, we select a
value L where L > l (e.g. L = l + 1). Then we
associate L0 with the first candidate in the ballot
draw order, L1 with the second candidate, and so on.
The onion for the j-th candidate will be encrypted
as Eˆpk(L
j−1) = (gL
j−1
yr, gr). However, we will show
in a later section that the tallying method for this
section has to be slightly different.
2.2 Ballot Generation
In Preˆt a` Voter, privacy depends on maintaining the
secrecy of the candidate order that corresponds to
a particular receipt. Since a printer actually has to
print both sides of the form, and hence can recog-
nise the receipt subsequently and recall the candidate
order, privacy depends on very strong assumptions
about the printer’s data being properly generated and
destroyed. We emphasise that this affects privacy,
not integrity, because the correctness of printing can
be audited.
Ballot generation must satisfy two main require-
ments:
• The ballot’s candidate ordering and the values
used for encryption must be random and not gen-
erated by any single party. (Otherwise a mali-
cious printer can use the receipt to leak informa-
tion about the votes via a kleptographic attack
[GKK+06].)
• As much as feasible, the ballot’s random data,
and the plaintext candidate list corresponding
to each RHS, must be secret.
We will use the distributed ballot generation of
[RT10], in which the candidate list mixers succes-
sively shuffle a list of encrypted candidate names for
each vote. This protocol guarantees the first condi-
tion above if at least one participant is honest. This
produces a list of encrypted ballots on the WBB,
each one consisting of a serial number, the list of
4
Fig. 1: vVote ballot form
In the following subsections the election phases covering the vVote system
components and protocols are explained.
2.2 Pre-election
The pre-election phase covers the preparation of election material before the
polling station opens. In this period, digital ballots are generated in a distributed
fashion that are encrypted under the print-on-demand (POD) service’s and the
election authority’s public key, before being committed to the public bulletin
board. Each component like the EBM and print stations requires a public key
pair in order to sign data. To allocate such public key certificates, an internal
Certificate Authority (CA) is deployed as the system is offline.
Additionally, mixnets are set up by exchanging co figuration files between
each mix server. This ensures that each mix server is aware of one another and
able to communicate each other. Key generation is als performed in this phase.
All fixed values, such as; digital ballots, candidate identifiers, race identifiers,
should be committed to the WBB before the election.
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Fig. 2: vVote design overview
Distributed Ballot Generation Ballot generation can be realised on the ma-
chine that prints the ballot form in the booth or in a distributed fashion that
is similar to that described in [RT10, Rya06], i.e. a number of candidate list
mixers shuffle the encrypted candidate names for each vote, which ensures that
the candidate ordering is random and not generated by a single party. This elim-
inates single point failures. In the distributed version, a list of encrypted ballots,
including a serial number, the onion encoding the candidate list, and the list of
encrypted candidate names for the printer with a proof of correspondence is pro-
duced. The onion encoding the candidate list are generated by a set of candidate
list key sharers, called the POD service in such a way that the candidate order-
ing is random by each contributing to the cryptographic values kept encrypted
throughout. The key shares of the tabulation/decryption tellers responsible for
the final decryption are known to the POD service and used in the construction
of the encrypted ballot forms. As a result, all the candidate list key sharers have
to collude in order to determine the seed values. In order for a printer (POD
client) to obtain the candidate list, it generates a blinding factor, encrypts it
under the POD service public key, and sends it to the POD service with a proof
of knowledge. Afterwards, having received the encrypted candidate list blinded
by itself, the printer removes the blinding factor, and prints the candidate list.
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2.3 During the Election
This phase starts with polling stations opening and lasts until the election is
closed, with no further votes being allowed to be cast. The POD service allo-
cates and transfers pre-prepared digital ballots to the WBB, and during the
election the print station in the polling booth retrieves the candidate permuta-
tion from the WBB for the assigned QR code. The voter is then able to print
out her ballot form. However, to ease the marking for the elections with so many
candidates, the ballot data can be transferred to an electronic environment. In
this new system, the electronic ballot marker (EBM) is particularly interesting
as it forms the key distinctive characteristic of vVote, being the only device in
the system that knows how a particular voter has voted. That is, when the voter
transfers her actual ballot form to the EBM, the candidate list on her form is
also transferred to the EBM, while it is destroyed and kept secret in Preˆt a`
Voter. One of the assumptions made in [BCH+12a, BCH+12b, Cul13] is that
the POD client, where physical ballot form is printed, and the EBM, are lo-
cated in a private environment, such as, a voting booth. During the election, the
EBM interacts with the WBB to submit the vote and receive digitally signed
receipt. This receipt is printed out for the voter by the POD client in a private
environment for the verification of her vote’s inclusion in the final tally. We now
describe the POD service and protocol in detail.
vVote POD Service and Protocol The POD service (also called candidate
list key sharers) provides distribution of digital ballots in a distributed manner
to the polling stations in any district. As the digital ballots are prepared and
committed to the WBB before the election, this service facilitates the print-
on-demand ballot distribution in real time (The details about the POD service
and any other part of the vVote system can be found in the software design
technical report [Cul13]. Despite the fact that it is still being updated in respect
of design changes, it is considered to be a natural stable description for use in
our analysis).
In the ballot generation procedure, the randomised candidate order of a ballot
is encrypted under the election public key pkEA and it is then transformed to
an encryption under the POD service’s public key pkPS without revealing the
underlying message, as described in [Jak99]. The same transformation technique
is also used in the POD protocol to transform the encryptions on the digital
ballots into the designated POD client’s public key pkPC and these transformed
ciphertexts cannot be decrypted by anyone other than the designated printer.
Other entities covered in the POD protocol are as follows:
Poll Worker: a combined abstraction of the poll worker and the system that the
poll worker is using.
POD Client: an online printer to print out voter receipt, and located in a private
environment.
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Ballot Manager: a server whose only role is to apportion serial numbers. It does
not need to be trusted, as its assignments are backed by the WBB.
In more detail, when the voter authenticates in the polling station, the poll
worker requests a random nonce-like sessionID from the administrator machine.
Following this, the poll worker sends the sessionID to the POD service, where
it is signed and stored. Having received the signed sessionID, the poll worker
hands it to the voter in barcode form. Then, the voter scans the barcode to
the POD client, which signs the sessionID and submits it to the POD service.
Subsequently, the POD service signs the district and the sessionID and submits
them to the ballot manager. Following that, the ballot manager finds the next
available serial number for that district, assigns it to the submitted sessionID,
and notifies the WBB for this assignment by signing them using its secret key
skBM . The WBB then sends a confirmation of this assignment to the ballot
manager, which returns this to the POD service. Now, the transformation of the
public keys that encrypt the ballot form takes place from pkPS to pkPC . Finally,
the POD service signs the serial number and sends along with the transformed
ciphertexts to the POD client, which can then decrypt these and print the actual
ballot for the voter.
2.4 Post Election
Post election is the phase where the cast votes are mixed by the mixnets, de-
crypted and tallied by a set of key sharers, such that only a threshold set of
these sharers can perform decryption.
Mixing After all votes are received by the WBB, each mix server should be able
to import the cast votes from the WBB and check the digital signatures posted to
the WBB at the end of each day. As the vote data submitted from the EBM to the
WBB is raw, the data is combined with the ciphertexts that were submitted to
the WBB during the ballot generation by matching the serial numbers. In order
to reduce the number of mixes Vote Packing is used. That is, all the votes will be
mixed together even if they are from different districts. All mixes and decryption
are provided by the Mixnet manager. It also provides feedbacks of possible errors
or connectivity problems to the end user. Following this, the decrypted values
are looked up in the vote packing table created previously. Once the Mixnet
has finished mixing and decrypting, the plaintext votes with relevant proofs of
shuffles are committed to the WBB (the details of the cryptographic primitives
that are used by the Mixnet, such as, zero-knowledge proofs and homomorphic
encryptions are abstracted away in our analysis as we assume that the ZKPs can
not be faked).
Tallying In the protocol, exponential ElGamal public key algorithm [ElG84] is
used to encrypt plaintext votes. Thus, the triple (p, g, gx) will form the public-
key, and (p, g, x) the secret key of an agent. The subsequent encryption of a
message, m, can be calculated as (gr,mhr), where h = gx, r ∈ Z∗q is a random
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value, and p and q are large random prime numbers, such that p = 2q+1 holds. In
the ballot form, there is a ciphertext next to each candidate. In order to decrypt
the ciphertext and to obtain m, one should compute (gr)−xmhr using the secret
value x as (gr)−xm(gx)r = m. Three different tallying methods for vVote are
provided in [BCH+12a]. However, in our modelling a generic decryption teller
is modelled for simplicity. It decrypts and counts the votes for each candidate
encrypted under the election authority’s public key, and the final results for each
candidate are announced by this teller once there is no more vote to count.
3 Communicating Sequential Processes
CSP is a formal language, designed to describe concurrent systems in terms
of components that interact by means of message passing. CSP allows us to
model systems in terms of processes, which can synchronize and interact with
the environment. Besides, it provides several semantic models to analyse the
behaviour of processes and systems.
In CSP, processes are defined in terms of events that the process can per-
form. A synchronised event can happen when all processes agree on executing
it; it happens when it is inevitable. The set of events that are visible is called
Σ. Processes are associated with an interface or alphabet, denoted αP . If no
alphabet is explicitly defined then it will be the set of events that the process
can perform. The simplest process is STOP , which fundamentally does nothing.
SKIP is another named process, which terminates immediately. However, it is
not a deadlock as in STOP , but a successful termination.
Given a process P and an event a in Σ, the prefix process a→ P is initially
willing to perform an event a. Therefore, it waits until the event, a, is performed
then behaves like the process P . Events can also be structured into any number
of parts. For example, an event of the form c.v can represent a channel c passing
value v. The set of values T that can pass along c is the type of c, so the set
of events associated with channel c of type T is {c.v | v ∈ T}. This is also
written {|c|}. If C is a set of channels, then {|C|} = ⋃c∈C{|c|}. The input
process c?x→ P (x) is initially prepared to accept a value that will be bound to
the locally introduced variable x along channel c, and then behave as P having
received input x.
CSP offers choice operations for processes, which are called external and
nondeterministic choice operators denoted as 2 and u respectively. The process
P 2 Q can act like P or Q depending on the choice of the initial event chosen by
the environment. For instance, for the process (a → P ) 2 (b → Q), if the first
event chosen is a then the process will behave as the process P , after performing
the event a. Similarly, if the first event chosen is the event b, subsequently the
process will act as the process Q. While the external choice operator leaves
the choice to its environment, in a nondeterministic process, the choice is made
internally. Thus, the process (a → P ) u (b → Q) can act as either a → P
or b → Q and the environment has no control over which. Indexed versions of
10 Murat Moran and James Heather
external and nondeterministic choices allow the choices to be made among a
number of processes.
Systems can be made up of a collection of processes that run in parallel
and synchronise on the events that they agree to perform. Alphabetised par-
allel P ‖ Q executes P and Q in parallel, where they have to synchronise on
those events that are in both of their alphabets, but they can perform other
events independently. Thus, they must only agree on the events in the intersec-
tion αP ∩αQ. This operator is associative and commutative, so we can combine
any number of processes in parallel in any order without ambiguity. Thus we
may write P ‖ Q ‖ R for the parallel combination of three processes. Alter-
natively, we may wish to run any two processes independently of each other,
i.e., they do not synchronise on any events, not even those that they share. The
interleaving operator is written “|||”. This also has an indexed form to describe
the interleaving of a family of processes (further details on CSP can be found
in [RSG+00, Ros10]).
4 vVote and Intruder Model
Conventionally, security protocols consist of several agents sending messages to
each other on the medium they share or on direct communication channels. The
vVote voting system is modelled in terms of a number of agent processes that
run in parallel and these processes behave as the corresponding components of
the voting system 5.
In the following subsections, the messages sent on the channels of the model
are defined. Secondly, the different kinds of channels that are needed for the
analysis are introduced along with the process definitions for each agent, which
compose the voting system model. Following this, the lazy spy intruder model
acting as a Dolev-Yao intruder is adapted to analyse such voting systems. Finally,
the system model and active intruder model are put together in order to reason
about the system as a whole later in the analysis section.
4.1 Data-types and Messages
Cryptographic primitives, such as encryptions and signatures, are modelled as
symbolic objects like the agents, the public and secret keys, the nonces and se-
rial numbers. For instance, encryption: Epk(f), decryption: Dsk(f), signature:
Ssk(f). Additionally, apart from these, the other messages, which can be a col-
lection of these cryptographic primitives, are also modelled as the data-types. In
this respect, the message including a serial number and an encrypted candidate
list (called raw ballots here) is denoted as Raw(s,Epk(l)), and a digital ballot
message formed by a signed serial number and an encrypted candidate list is
5 CSP code for vVote model and the adaptation of lazy spy into the analysis from
which the experimental results given in this article can downloaded from the principal
author’s personal webpage http://muratmoran.wordpress.com/publications/ under
the CSP codes title
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modelled as DigB(Ssk(s),Epk(l)). Similarly, a ballot form consisting of a candi-
date list, a serial number, and an index value, is B(l, s, Ind.i); a message with
a serial number and an index value forming the marking boxes on the ballot
form, called castrhs, which is demonstrated as RHS(s, Ind.i); and a receipt is the
signed castrhs denoted as R(Ssk(RHS(s, Ind.i))). Finally, a message consisting of
an index value and an encrypted candidate list is called a vote and shown as
V(Ind.i,Epk(l)). Figure 3 depicts how these messages are composed in the model.
In order to compose these messages, the model consists of several finite sets
of facts, F, as listed below. The abbreviation W stands for the web bulletin
board, T is Tom, the poll worker, EA is the election authority, PS and PC
are the POD service and client, respectively, and BM is the ballot manager.
For convenience, names are abbreviated as follows: the set of candidates as C,
voters as V, agents as A, serial numbers as S, nonces as N, and public-keys and
secret-keys as PK and SK, respectively.
C = {Archimedes,Babbage},V = {Alice,Bob, James}
A =
⋃
(V, {Tom, authority, wbb, teller, podservice,
podclient, ballotmngr, ebm, printer})
S = {s1, s2, s3},N = {na, nb, nc}
PK= {pkA | A ∈ {W,T,EA,PS, PC,BM}}
SK = {skA | A ∈ {W,T,EA,PS, PC,BM}}
The agents send various kinds of messages to each other, which need to be
defined in terms of data-types. The messages mentioned above and illustrated in
Figure 3 form the message set M. The names of the sets are indicative of what
messages they represent. However, to remove the ambiguity; castrhs represents
the cast ballots, L is the set of all possible candidate lists, and I is the set
of indices with how the voter is modelled to fill in the marking boxes for her
preferred candidate.
4.2 Channel Types
The channels have the form A.A.M, where A is the set of agents and M is the
set of messages that agents may wish to transmit over the channels and these
are listed in Figure 3.
The original framework introduced in [Low95] analysing the Needham Schroe-
der Public Key (NSPK) protocol involves only (InS) Insecure channels, i.e. the
whole network is not secure, and hence, any message can be manipulated in
many ways by the intruder. The intruder can block, overhear and spoof any
message transmitted on the insecure communication channels between the le-
gitimate agents. This kind of communication channels are directly connected to
the intruder using the renaming operator in CSP. Hence, there is no restriction
in the intruder process about what he can or cannot perform on the insecure
communication channels. In order words, he can act as the Dolev-Yao intruder
model on such channels.
Such an assumption is too strong for voting systems that require an envi-
ronment for the voters to be able to vote privately, such as a voting booth, at
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signednonces = {Ssk(n) | sk ←SK,
n ←N}
signednonsers = {Ssk(s, n) | sk ← SK,
s ← S,
n ←N}
rawballots = {Raw(s,Epk(l)) | s ← S,
pk ←PK,
l ←L}
digitalballots = {DigB(Ssk(s),Epk(l)) | sk ← SK,
pk ←PK
s ← S,
l ←L}
indices = {Ind.i | i ← Int}
ballotforms = {B(l, s, Ind.i) | l ←L,
s ← S,
Ind.i← I,
a ←A}
castrhs = {RHS(s, Ind.i) | s ← S,
Ind.i← I}
receipts = {R(Ssk(RHS(s, Ind.i))) | s ← S,
Ind.i← I,
sk ← SK}
votes = {V(Ind.i,Epk(l)) | Ind.i← I,
pk ←PK,
l ←L}
atomicfacts = {f | f ←∪{V,N, I}}
Fig. 3: Message types used in the modelling
least if the action of receiving a ballot form is modelled as a message. This is
also the case for most of the remote voting systems, where it is assumed that no
one is watching over the voters’ shoulder while she is casting her vote. Hence,
this necessitates the existence of private channels in the voting system model.
To this end, the agents in the model are enabled to communicate over a secure
channel (S), called scomm, on which the intruder has no power at all. For in-
stance, when the voter is given the ballot form by the poll worker, messages
including the sensitive data regarding the candidate order, are transmitted over
scomm channels. In the modelling of such channels, different channel names, like
scomm, are used to distinguish the secure channels from others in order to hide
the crucial information from the intruder. As stated previously, the intruder’s
ability is modelled using the renaming operator in the process definition of the
intruder. This is to say that the intruder can perform all his bad behaviour on
the channels that are connected to his process definition using renaming. Hence,
the secure channel scomm is shared only between honest agents, and not with
the intruder.
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We here assume that at least two eligible honest voters are able to vote,
and the cast votes are tallied at the end of the election. That is because an
attack regarding the voter’s privacy occurs in which the intruder blocks all the
communication channels except the one on which the target voter communicates
in order to cast her vote. Thus, the intruder would learn how the voter has
voted. Therefore, at least two honest voters should be able to cast their votes
without any blocking so that the intruder cannot deduce how each of them has
voted (it will be explained further in Section 6). This assumption requires that
there exists a channel in the voting system model such that the communications
made by these two honest voters with the other agents are No Spoofing and
Blocking (NSB) channels modelled as nsbcomm here, and they are combinations
of two different channel types; No Blocking (NB) and No Spoofing (NS) channels.
On such channels the intruder can overhear the communication, but cannot
block its occurrence and spoof any messages. Creese et al. [CGH+05] describe
various kinds of channels for pervasive computing environments. For instance,
the No OverHearing channel c (NOHc) is that which cannot be overheard, the
No Blocking channel c (NBc) is the channel that cannot be blocked and the
No Spoofing channel c (NSc) is the channel type that cannot be spoofed. The
three NOHc , NBc and NSc form the secure channels scomm in the modelling.
The NB channels in CSP are modelled when the intruder process is renamed to
take/block messages from the channels on the network.
Using CSP the set of messages that make sense to the protocol (they are
from real communications between agents), called comms, can be defined as the
union of sets of data objects for each message type. For instance, the following
defines the vote messages sent by one agent to another.
commVotes = {a.b.m | m ← votes, a ← A, b ← A, a 6= b}
These are also useful when the intruder is afforded the ability to modify the
messages on the insecure channels or not to block and fake certain data from
specific agents as it may be confusing as to whether the message is already
known or has just been learned from the real communication that the intruder
overhears. This is used in modelling the intruder by defining the set of legitimate
insecure messages sent from one agent to another Ucomms. Similarly, insecure
NB messages Nbcomms from real communication can be defined so and later
used to determine what the intruder can overhear, spoof but not block.
Although, the existence of NB channels solves one problem, which is the
unwanted privacy attack previously mentioned, there is another plausible attack
where the intruder does not block the messages on NB channels, but can later
modify and spoof the messages, i.e. the intruder cannot take/block, but he can
still fake messages overheard from the NB channels. Hence, if the intruder can
modify and spoof one of the messages sent from one of those honest two voters,
he can then deduce the other private message by looking at the election result
as in the previous attack. Therefore, there is a need for a channel that cannot
be spoofed, called No Spoofing (NS) channels. On NS channels, the intruder can
overhear but cannot block or spoof messages. This is exactly what we need in
order to allow two honest voters to cast their votes without any interruption
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and modification. As such a channel is no blocking and spoofing channel, it will
be called as No spoofing and blocking (NSB) channel from now on, and in the
CSP definitions of the voting system and intruder model it will be expressed as
nsbcomm.
As mentioned earlier, secure channels are combinations of NB, NS and NOH
channels. NOH channels are the channels that the intruder cannot overhear any
messages on. On such channels the intruder can block and spoof messages, but
cannot overhear the communication channel. The implementation of this channel
in CSP is similar to the others’—it is modelled by restricting what the intruder
can overhear with a defined set of network messages.
For the analysis of vVote later in this article, we need to define what in-
formation flows over: secure channels scomm, insecure channels comm, and no
spoofing and blocking channels nsbcomm, because of the reasons explained pre-
viously. This can be done in two ways: the first one is that all agents on the
network work on insecure communication channels (comm) in which case secure,
and no spoofing and blocking channels need to be defined. The second way is
that all agents communicate over a NSB channel (nsbcomm), and the secure and
insecure channels are defined accordingly. As we know what information should
be shared with the intruder, it is easier to define the insecure communications
than defining the others, meaning that the second way of defining channels is
the one to follow for the ease of modelling. This will also help to reduce the size
of the required state space for automated analysis. In terms of the deduction
system that is used in the model, following the second way does not have any
impact on the deductions that may be made by the intruder because the same
set of information is given to the intruder and the deduction system remains
the same in each case. Table 1 illustrates the intruder’s capabilities on different
channels used in this analysis.
Secure No OverHearing No Spoofing and Blocking Insecure
(S) (NOH) (NSB) (InS)
overhear X X X X
block X X X X
spoof X X X X
Table 1: The intruder’s capabilities on different channels
Finally, there exist a number of other channels that regulate the protocol
run, such as; openElection, closeElection, enterBooth, leaveBooth, bagempty and
done. However these will not be discussed any further.
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4.3 Modelling Assumptions
Although the aim in the modelling of voting systems is to obtain a model that
reflects real system behaviour, there are a few assumptions that need to be made
in order to avoid state explosion, which also result in abstractions in some of
the features of the vVote voting system. For instance, although vVote supports
the AV and STV electoral methods, FPTP will be modelled due to its simplicity
in this analysis. Thus, possible privacy attacks to the system that may occur
in the AV and STV electoral methods are not considered here. Additionally,
in the original vVote system, ballot generation is made in a distributed fashion,
which allows verifiable generation of ballot forms by distributing the trust among
various entities. However, in the modelling of vVote, it is assumed that there is
one honest single entity, election authority, who generates the candidate lists
and digital ballot papers. This assumption can also be read as the entities that
are responsible for distributed generation of ballot forms are honest and work
as a single process. Similarly the WBB is a threshold-based service, which signs
messages by co-operation. However, the threshold parties in the vVote model
are treated as single entities.
The vVote voting system uses a mixnet to shuffle the encrypted votes cast
during the election as in Preˆt a` Voter. Previously, in [MHS14], a CSP model of
the mixnet has been given, which works as a perfect mixnet (no link between
its inputs and outputs due to its non-deterministic behaviour). However, here
in vVote modelling we omit this mixnet process as the WBB process already
outputs the encrypted messages non-deterministically to the decryption tellers.
This can also be thought as that the mixnet process is embedded in the WBB
process, removing the communication between a WBB process and a mixnet
one. Thus, there is no point of having two subsequent non-deterministic choices
over the same inputs in terms of efficient and effective modelling. Regarding the
analysis of this voting system model without a mixnet process, as the commu-
nication channels between WBB and mixnet is no blocking link because of the
reasons given in Section 4.2 and the messages are encrypted under authorities
public key, there is not much that the intruder can do over these channels. Ad-
ditionally, everything that the intruder can perform over the channel from the
mixnet to the WBB can also be realised over the channel from the WBB to
the decryption tellers because the messages and channel types are of the same
format.
The vVote voting system employs a district information for each voter in
order to allow them to vote in different constituencies. Because the modelling
and analysis of this voting system does not cover this aspect of voting, the district
information, used in the POD protocol, is omitted. Hence, with this abstraction,
the possible privacy-related attacks to the system that may emerge with if the
district information was used are not touched here.
Finally, it is assumed here that there exists only one poll worker, which opens
a session for each voter with a fresh nonce. This would not impact our analysis
as in the case of existence of multiple poll workers in a polling station, voters
could only authenticate themselves without awaiting each other with different
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poll workers. However, if the cast votes were to be published on the BB one by
one in the model, then there might have been issues regarding this assumption.
This is because in the current model voters cast their vote in order and if the
intruder could see the cast votes published on the BB in the same order, then
he could violate voter anonymity.
4.4 Honest Participants
The vVote voting system model developed for this work is defined by the pro-
cesses illustrated at the top of Figure 4. All the processes are involved in the
protocol by sending, receiving messages on the synchronised channels and the
model behaves exactly as in Figure 4. Moreover, the model covers all phases of
the vVote, including the POD protocol.
Poll Worker POD Service POD Client Authority Ballot Mngr WBB Voter EBM Printer Teller
ID
SskT (nonce)
SskPS(nonce)
nonce
SskPC(nonce)
SskPS(nonce)
SskBM (SerialNo, nonce)
SskW (SerialNo, nonce)
SskW (SerialNo, nonce)
SskW (SerialNo, nonce)
Raw(SerialNo,EpkEA(CandList))
Raw(SerialNo,EpkPS(CandList))
DigB(SskPS(SerialNo),EpkPC(CandList))
B(CandList, Ind.0, SskPS(SerialNo))
B(CandList, Ind.0, SskPS(SerialNo))
Ind.i
RHS(SskPS(SerialNo), Ind.i)
R(SskW (RHS(SskPS(SerialNo), Ind.i)))
R(SskW (RHS(SskPS(SerialNo), Ind.i)))
V(Ind.i,EpkEA(CandList))
ARCHIMEDES.m, BABBAGE.n
Fig. 4: vVote system model
Voter Process With the parameterised process Voter(v , c), the behaviour of
a voter v ∈ V voting for a chosen candidate c ∈ C is modelled. There exist
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two honest voters, Alice and Bob, and a misbehaving one, James, who behaves
honestly in the model at first, but his secret will be shared with the intruder
later on and whose communications, even the private and NSB ones, are used
by the intruder.
Having authenticated herself on the NSB channel with the poll worker, Tom,
the voter receives a ballot form from the POD client with the candidate list
printed on it and scans her ballot data to the EBM on the secure channel,
where she can see her ballot in an electronic environment. After indicating her
preference by sending the index value (Ind.i) to the EBM that corresponds to
the candidate she wants to vote for—the index i is found by using the function
find(c, l), which finds the candidate c in the sequence of candidates l and defined
as below, she then receives her signed receipt and leaves the polling station.
Voter(v , c) =̂
openElection→ nsbcomm.v.Tom.v →
2
l∈L
s∈S

scomm.podclient.v.B(l,SskPS (s), Ind.0)→
scomm.v.ebm.B(l,SskPS (s), Ind.0)→
2
i:=find(c,l)

nsbcomm.v.ebm.Ind.i→
nsbcomm.printer.v.
R(SskW (RHS(SskPS (s), Ind.i)))→
closeElection→ STOP


where the function, find(), is defined as
find(c, l) =
{
1 if c = head(l)
1 + find(c, tail(l)) if c 6= head(l)
All eligible voters, Alice, Bob and James, follow this protocol, which is mod-
elled as the parallel running of all individual voter processes synchronising on
openElection and closeElection pairwise with the election authority. That is,
each voter performs an openElection event to begin her voting process. Each
voter must also perform a closeElection event after casting their individual vote
and leaving the polling station.
Voters =̂ ‖v,cVoter(v, c)
Poll Worker Process The poll worker, Tom, authenticates voters and starts
a fresh session for each of them by choosing a nonce n from the set of nonces
N. He ensures that he always authenticates a different voter, and commences a
new session with a fresh nonce. The poll worker is not involved in any private
communication as he only sends and receives signed nonces from and to the
POD service and sends nonces to the POD client.
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Pollworker(V,N) =̂
closeElection→ STOP2
2
v∈V

nsbcomm.v.Tom.v →
u
n∈N

nsbcomm.Tom.podservice.SskT (n)→
nsbcomm.podservice.Tom.SskPS (n)→
nsbcomm.Tom.podclient.n→
Pollworker(V 8 {v},N 8 {n})


Election Authority Process Authority is the election authority process,
which assigns a random candidate list from the list L for a particular serial
number that has been asked for along with a nonce from the ballot manager.
Following this, Authority submits two copies of the raw ballot form: one is en-
crypted under the election authority’s public key pkEA and sent to the WBB,
the other is encrypted under the POD service public key pkPS and sent to the
POD service. Hence, the WBB and the POD service keep the same candidate
list associated for a particular serial number, but encrypted under different keys.
Authority =̂ openElection→ Authority1 (S,L)
Authority1 (∅,L) =̂ closeElection→ STOP
Authority1 (S,L) =̂2
2
s∈S
n∈N

nsbcomm.ballotmngr.authority.SskBM (s, n)→
u
l∈L
nsbcomm.authority.wbb.Raw(s,EpkEA(l))nsbcomm.authority.podservice.Raw(s,EpkPS (l))
Authority1 (S 8 {s},L)


POD Service Process Following a fresh session, the POD service (candidate
list key sharers) receives a serial number s from the ballot manager and the
encrypted candidate list EpkPS (l) associated with s from the election authority,
which is called a raw ballot. Subsequently, the digital ballot form consisting
of a signed serial number and the encrypted candidate list is sent to the POD
client after a transformation made on the encrypted candidate list from the POD
service’s public key pkPS to POD client’s public key pkPC .
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Podservice =̂
closeElection→ STOP2
2
n∈N

nsbcomm.Tom.podservice.SskT (n)→
nsbcomm.podservice.Tom.SskPS (n)→
nsbcomm.podclient.podservice.SskPC (n)→
nsbcomm.podservice.ballotmngr.SskPS (n)→
2
s∈S

nsbcomm.ballotmngr.podservice.SskW (s, n)→
2
l∈L

nsbcomm.authority.podservice.
Raw(s,EpkPS (l))
nsbcomm.podservice.podclient.
DigB(SskPS (s),EpkPC (l))→
Podservice



POD Client Process The POD Client process is responsible for printing out
the ballot form, which has been received as a digital ballot from the POD service
(note that this should not be confused with the receipt printer). The candidate
list on this digital ballot l is encrypted under the POD client’s public key pkPC
with empty marking boxes denoted by Ind.0. Having extracted the candidate
list, the POD client prints the actual ballot form for the voter on the private
channel.
Podclient =̂
closeElection→ STOP2
2
n∈N

nsbcomm.Tom.podclient.n→
nsbcomm.podclient.podservice.SskPC (n)→
2
s∈S
l∈L

nsbcomm.podservice.podclient.
DigB(SskPS (s),EpkPC (l))→
u
v∈V
(
scomm.podclient.v.B(l,SskPS (s), Ind.0)→
Podclient
)


Ballot Manager Process The ballot manager apportions the serial numbers
to each ballot form uniquely and commits them to the WBB. Additionally, it
also notifies the election authority and the POD service about the serial number
being used.
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Ballotmanager =̂ openElection→ Ballotmanager(S)
Ballotmanager(∅) =̂ closeElection→ STOP
Ballotmanager(S) =̂
closeElection→ STOP2
2
n∈N

nsbcomm.podservice.ballotmngr.SskPS (n)→
u
s∈S

nsbcomm.ballotmngr.wbb.SskBM (s, n)→
nsbcomm.ballotmngr.authority.SskBM (s, n)→
nsbcomm.wbb.ballotmngr.SskW (s, n)→
nsbcomm.ballotmngr.podservice.SskW (s, n)→
Ballotmanager(S 8 {s})


The Electronic Ballot Marker (EBM) The EBM is a device to help voters
to mark their preferences. Having received her ballot form from the POD client,
the voter goes into the booth and scans her ballot form to transfer the ballot
information to the EBM on the secure channel scomm. She then fills out the
electronic ballot form on the screen by interacting with the machine and choos-
ing the index value Ind.i corresponding to her chosen candidate. Although no
one is supposed to be observing voter interaction with the EBM, it is assumed
here that the index value sent from voter to the EBM can be observed by the in-
truder, as it will be observed anyway once she takes her receipt from the receipt
printer. Afterwards, the EBM sends the marking boxes side of the ballot form,
RHS(SskPS (s), Ind.i), to the WBB, which can then be checked by the voters.
EBM =̂closeElection→ STOP2
2
l∈L
s∈S
v∈V
scomm.v.ebm.B(l,SskPS (s), Ind.0)→2
i∈I
(
nsbcomm.v.ebm.Ind.i→
nsbcomm.ebm.wbb.RHS(SskPS (s), Ind.i)→ EBM
)
Receipt Printer Process The receipt printer process behaves as a typical
printer, i.e. it receives the receipt r from the WBB, and prints it out for the
voter v. Note that the POD client and this printer process are two different
printers located in different places in the polling station.
Printer =̂closeElection→ STOP2
2
v∈V
r∈receipts
(
nsbcomm.wbb.printer.r →
nsbcomm.printer.v.r → Printer
)
The Web Bulletin Board Process The WBB is a public bulletin board that
broadcasts the committed data during the election, such as submitted votes
and signed serial numbers. Moreover, there is nothing private about this pro-
cess as everything is publicly verifiable. Having received all the cast votes and
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sending the receipts for each voter, the WBB transfers them in the form of
V(Ind.i,EpkEA(l)) to the decryption teller (election key sharers) non-deterministically.
Note that a mixnet, such as re-encryption mixnet used in Preˆt a` Voter,
shuffles the cast votes arbitrarily, and outputs them in the new randomised order.
In our model, this randomisation process is captured in the WBB itself, which
simply outputs the votes in a non-deterministic order. Essentially this models
having a perfect mixnet embedded in the WBB. This simplifies the model, and
also helps in terms of reduction of the state space.
Once the teller has finished the tallying, it sends the result for each candidate
(Archimedes and Babbage) to the WBB.
WBB =̂ openElection →WBB1 (∅)
WBB1 (bag) =̂
closeElection→WBB2 (bag)2
2
n∈N
s∈S

nsbcomm.ballotmngr.wbb.SskBM (s, n)→
nsbcomm.wbb.ballotmngr.SskW (s, n)→
2
l∈L

nsbcomm.authority.wbb.Raw(s,EpkEA(l))
2
i∈I

nsbcomm.ebm.wbb.RHS(SskPS (s), Ind.i)→
nsbcomm.wbb.printer.
SskW (RHS(SskPS (s), Ind.i))→
WBB1 (bag ∪ {V(Ind.i ,EpkEA(l))})



WBB2 (∅) =̂ bagempty → nsbcomm.Archimedes?t1 →
nsbcomm.Babbage?t2 → done → STOP
WBB2 (bag) =̂ u
v∈votes
nsbcomm.wbb.teller .v →WBB2 (bag 8 {v})
Decryption Teller Process The decryption teller process—it is a thresholded
setup, called decryption key sharers, but here this property is abstracted away
and modelled as a single CSP process—is responsible for decrypting the votes
encrypted under the election authority’s public key pkEA and tallying them for
each candidate. The results are then sent back to the WBB. What happens
in the third line of the process is that because the decryption teller possesses
the shared secret key skEA (shared in the real system), it can decrypt and
extract the candidate list of the cast votes as in l := DskEA(EpkEA(l)). The teller
then identifies for whom the vote is by checking the ith element of the list l.
Accordingly, it increments the total vote received by that particular candidate
by one. Once there are no more votes to tally, the teller announces the total
votes for each candidate.
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Teller =̂ openElection → Teller1 (0 , 0 )
Tel ler1 (m,n) =̂
2
i∈I
l∈L

nsbcomm.wbb.teller.V(Ind.i,EpkEA(l))→ ifnth(i,DskEA(EpkEA(l))) = Archimedes then Teller1 (m + 1 ,n)
else
(
ifnth(i,DskEA(EpkEA(l))) = Babbage then
Teller1 (m,n + 1 ) else STOP
) 

2
bagempty → nsbcomm.Archimedes.m → nsbcomm.Babbage.n → SKIP
where the function, nth(), is defined as
nth(i,m) =
{
head(m) if i = 1
nth(i− 1, tail(m)) if i 6= 1
4.5 Adapting Lazy Spy
Lazy spy [Ros97] is an efficient intruder model as it avoids state explosion by
following only its findings (deductions through the messages he has seen or from
his initial knowledge). This intruder model provides active attacks against the
system by not only observing the communication channels, but also blocking
messages or generating and sending fake messages to any agents on the sys-
tem. The framework should be altered so it can work with the cryptographic
voting systems. In particular, the vVote voting system model is equipped with
a number of voting system specific messages as well as the cryptographic ones
(see Figure 3). Hence, the existence of these messages requires further deduction
rules that need to be defined so that the intruder can act as he is supposed to
regarding those messages. Secondly, the initial knowledge of the intruder IK is
also model specific, hence, it needs to be defined according to the voting system
model and as this set of knowledge is used to specify what the intruder knows
and what he can learn, it needs to be defined carefully. Lastly, because of the
introduction of various channel types in the analysis of voting systems, the in-
truder model needs to be amended so that the private channels stay private and
NSB channels are, indeed, not blocked or spoofed by the intruder.
In order to allow the intruder to compose messages, there are a number of
deduction rules. Recall that a deduction is a pair (X, f), where X is a finite
set of facts and f is the fact that can be generated, providing that the intruder
possesses X and these inferences are denoted as X ` f . It should be ensured
that the intruder deals with a finite set of facts because FDR cannot handle an
infinite number of states. Thus, arbitrary nesting of encryptions and sequences
needs to be avoided. To do so, the set of data-types are limited to the types
that are enough to build protocol messages. Although the intruder can generate
“bad” facts (objects that are not of the form real messages sent among protocol
agents), these facts will do him no good [RSG+00]. That is because the agents in
the protocol can only communicate with the messages that they understand—the
messages need to be in the same form as they are expected. Hence, the deduc-
tion rules with which the intruder is able to build and decompose all protocol
messages are adequate for the analysis.
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In Section 5, we shall need to introduce an algebraic equivalence over mes-
sages in order to model anonymity correctly, and ensure that the intruder cannot
draw conclusions about voters’ actions based on the contents of encryptions for
which he does not have the decryption key. Equivalences are not considered
in [RSG+00], and for good reason: they are liable to cause trouble with the ar-
gument used there to justify a strong typing assumption. However, it should be
noted that this equivalence we shall introduce will not be used in the deduction
rules that the intruder can use to generate new knowledge; it is used only in the
specification. It cannot, therefore, be used by the intruder to break the typing
system.
The deduction rules regarding this analysis D are the union of deductions de-
fined in Table 2. The original framework provides the deduction rules regarding
cryptographic primitives, and the rest is specific to the vVote voting system. The
new deduction rule BALLOT-COMP enables ballot forms to be composed if the
intruder possesses the set {l,Ssk(s), Ind.i}, where l is the candidate list, s is serial
number and Ind.i is the index value, corresponding to the chosen candidate and
conversely the deduction rule BALLOT-DCMP helps the intruder to decompose
ballot forms and obtain all the data on it. Similarly, the intruder can also work on
any composition and decomposition of any other messages in the model. For in-
stance, RHS-COMP and RHS-DCMP are the deduction rules related to cast bal-
lot forms, consisting of an index value and a signed serial number {Ind.i,Ssk(s)}.
VOTE-COMP and VOTE-DCMP are the deduction rules related to the votes,
in the form of V(Ind.i,Epk(l)) (note that these do not contain a serial number).
The deduction rules regarding the digital ballots, consisting of a signed serial
number and an encrypted candidate list, {Ssk(s),Epk(l)}, are DIG.BLT-COMP
and DIG.BLT-DCMP. Similarly, RAW.BLT-COMP and RAW.BLT-DCMP are
the two deduction rules that help the intruder compose and decompose the raw
ballots,{s,Epk(l)}, and IND-COMP and IND-DCMP are the index related de-
duction rules. Hence, with this set of deduction rules, D, the intruder is enabled
to deduce messages that are used to attack the protocol.
As mentioned earlier, the set comms needs to be defined for all messages in
the model illustrated in Figure 3 so that the intruder can justify that a message
being heard is actually from a real communication between agents. As in the
protocol, no agent sends any message to himself, for such communications are
ensured to be omitted with a 6= b below, which also implies that if an agent
sends a message to himself, it cannot be blocked or spoofed by the intruder.
comms = {a.b.m | m ←M, a ← A, b ← A, a 6= b}
The messages in the model that make sense to the intruder are: comms, all the
messages from real communications, Nsbcomms, the set of messages that cannot
be blocked or spoofed by the intruder, and Ucomms, the set of insecure messages
that the intruder can act as in the Dolev-Yao intruder model [DY83].
As all honest participants communicate on the NSB channels, not including a
message type in the set Nsbcomms means that the intruder cannot even overhear
that kind of message. Hence, the messages in the form of a ballot are not included
in this set, as the intruder should not be able to observe any communication
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SYM-ENC. {k,m} ` Ek(m)
SYM-DEC. {k,Ek(m)} ` m
ASYM-ENC. {pk,m} ` Epk(m)
ASYM-DEC. {sk,Epk(m)} ` m
SIGN-SIG. {sk,m} ` Ssk(m)
SIGN-EXT. {pk, Ssk(m)} ` m
BALLOT-COMP. {l,Ssk(s), Ind.i} ` B(l,Ssk(s), Ind.i)
BALLOT-DCMP. {B(l,Ssk(s), Ind.i)} ` l,Ssk(s), Ind.i
RHS-COMP. {Ind.i,Ssk(s)} ` RHS(Ind.i,Ssk(s))
RHS-DCMP. {RHS(Ssk(s), Ind.i)} ` Ind.i,Ssk(s)
VOTE-COMP. {Ind.i,Epk(l)} ` V(Ind.i,Epk(l))
VOTE-DCMP. {V(Ind.i,Epk(l))} ` Ind.i,Epk(l)
DIG.BLT-COMP. {Ssk(s),Epk(l)} ` DigB(Ssk(s),Epk(l))
DIG.BLT-DCMP. {DigB(Ssk(s),Epk(l))} ` Ssk(s),Epk(l)
RAW.BLT-COMP. {s,Epk(l)} ` Raw(s,Epk(l))
RAW.BLT-DCMP. {Raw(s,Epk(l))} ` s,Epk(l)
IND-COMP. {i} ` Ind.i
IND-DCMP. {Ind.i} ` i
Table 2: Deduction rules capturing the properties of cryptographic primitives
and the vVote voting system messages.
involving a ballot form between honest participants (denoted as commBallots).
For example, a voter scanning her ballot form to the EBM should not be observed
by the intruder and this is how he is prevented from overhearing and blocking
the private channels.
Nsbcomms = comms 8 commBallots 6
The insecure messages that the intruder can overhear, block or use in any way
in the line of Dolev-Yao model, are defined with the set Ucomms as follows. It
should be noted that the set in the analysis of vVote covers all the messages that
are communicated by the dishonest voter James.
Ucomms =
⋃
({q.q′.f | q.q′.f ← comms, q ← {James}, q′ ← agents},
{q.q′.f | q.q′.f ← comms, q ← agents, q′ ← {James}})
6 We denote the set subtraction as 8 in order to distinguish it from the hiding operator
“\” in CSP.
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The set Ucomms can be extended with any set of information. For instance,
the insecure communications in Ucomms do not yet include the receipts taken
by the voters during the election. Hence, the intruder cannot cannot block the
voters’ taking their receipts as they are still on the no blocking channel. However,
if we add the set of receipts that can be taken away by any voters (denoted as
commReceipts) to the set Ucomms, then the intruder could also block the voters
taking their receipts because in such case receipt information would flow on the
insecure communication channels. However, it should be noted that the more
information is given to the intruder, the longer the automated verification takes
due to the increased number of deductions made by the intruder.
The adaptation of the intruder model to voting systems analysis has been
made by introducing different channel types, introduced in this section, and the
CSP definition of the lazy spy intruder model is kept intact. Further details
about the lazy spy intruder model, which is called Intruder here and defined in
terms of the channels learn and say, can be found in [Ros97].
4.6 Putting the Network Together
Figure 5 illustrates how the intruder is connected to the dishonest voter James,
and the honest voter Alice, whereby Alice’s private channel scomm is kept pri-
vate, but her insecure NSB channels can be observed by the intruder, whereas all
the channels of James are under the control of the intruder. That is, the intruder
can overhear all insecure communications acting as a medium, but he can only
intercept and fake the messages in the form of insecure data Ucomms (it de-
fines all communications from and to James) as defined in the previous section.
Moreover, he has no power over the private channels of the honest voters.
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Fig. 5: The lazy spy intruder model
The processes that construct the voting system model and the intruder model
are connected by using the renaming operator. That is, nsbcomm.a.b.m and
learn channels are renamed to a take channel, and the nsbcomm.b.a.m and
say channels are renamed to a fake channel from the agent a’s point of view.
Similarly, the intruder process is also renamed and the aim is to connect the
intruder with the agents. Hence, the intruder channel learn.m is mapped to
the events of the form take.a.b.m, and say.m is renamed to fake.a.b.m. To this
26 Murat Moran and James Heather
end, a renaming function for the process P and agent name p can be defined as
follows:
r(P, p) =̂ P [[nsbcomm.p, take.p/nsbcomm.p, nsbcomm.p]]
[[nsbcomm.a.p, fake.a.p/nsbcomm.a.p, nsbcomm.a.p | a ∈ A]]
[[scomm.p, take.p/scomm.p, scomm.p]]
[[scomm.a.p, fake.a.p/scomm.a.p, scomm.a.p | a ∈ A]]
Hence, the renamed voter process for the voter v, for instance, can be defined as
follows. Note that, the private channel scomm is renamed to the take and fake
channels, because this models the malicious behaviour of a corrupt voter.
r(Voter(v, c), v) =̂
Voter(v, c)
[[nsbcomm.v, take.v/nsbcomm.v, nsbcomm.v]]
[[nsbcomm.a.v, fake.a.v/nsbcomm.a.v, nsbcomm.a.v | a ∈ A]]
[[scomm.v, take.v/scomm.v, scomm.v]]
[[scomm.a.v, fake.a.v/scomm.a.v, scomm.a.v | a ∈ A]]
Similarly, the other processes that construct the vVote voting system model
are renamed as in the above example. Consequently, the voting system model,
Model , which is ready to be modified by the intruder, is defined as the parallel
composition of all those renamed processes.
Model =̂rVoters ‖ rPollworker ‖ rAuthority ‖ rEBM ‖ rPodservice
‖ rPrinter ‖ rBallotmanager ‖ rPodclient ‖ rWBB ‖ rTeller
The parallel composition (interface parallel) above is constructed in a way that
the processes only synchronise on the nsbcomm and scomm channels on which
they send messages to each other, leaving the insecure channels (take, fake)
vulnerable to be used by the intruder. The following shows how two processes
are put in an interface parallel and therefore, the above parallel composition of
Model should be constructed in this way.
Model =̂ rVoters ‖
X
rPollworker ‖ . . .
where X = {|nsbcomm.v.Tom, nsbcomm.Tom.v,
scomm.v.Tom, scomm.Tom.v | v ← V |}
Similarly, the intruder process is prepared by renaming as below so that the
intruder can overhear the messages on the insecure NSB channels (Nsbcomms)
and act as the Dolev-Yao intruder on the insecure channels (Ucomms). For the
vVote analysis, these sets are defined in the previous section.
rIntruder =̂
Intruder
[[say, learn/say, say]]
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[[nsbcomm.p.p
′.f, take.q.q′.f/learn.f, learn.f |
p.p′.f ∈ Nsbcomms,
q.q′.f ∈ Ucomms,
p 6= p′, q 6= q′
]]
[[fake.p.p
′.f/say.f | p.p′.f ∈ Ucomms, p 6= p′]]
The process SystemvVote is then defined in terms of the parallel composition of
Model and rIntruder, which synchronise on the channels they share.
SystemvVote =̂ Model ‖{
nsbcomm, take, fake
} rIntruder
Having modelled the system, it is ready to be automatically analysed under the
anonymity requirement in the next section.
5 vVote Analysis
In this section, the first fully-automated analysis of the vVote voting system
is presented under a Dolev-Yao intruder model and using the weak anonymity
definition given in [MHS14] as the specification. It requires that when the two
channels c.x and d.x are swapped over for all values of x, if the resulting process
is indistinguishable from the original one, then the process provides anonymity.
In the previous section, the system where the honest agents of the voting system
model and the intruder interact has been modelled as the process SystemvVote .
In this system, the process rVoters is defined as the parallel composition of the
rVoter() processes for each of the voters: Alice, Bob and James. However, the
anonymity specification in this analysis is approached in a different way whereby
the two systems, which are expected to be indistinguishable, are defined as two
separate system behaviours without using the renaming operator. Hence, the
following processes, namely, rVoters1 and rVoters2 model the two different vot-
ers’ behaviour, which may result in two different system behaviours: on the one
hand Alice votes for Archimedes, Bob votes for Babbage and James can vote for
either Archimedes or Babbage, whereas on the other hand, Alice votes for Bab-
bage, Bob votes for Archimedes and again James can vote for any of them. The
resulting two different system behaviours are System ′vVote and System
′′
vVote ,
respectively. Note that the misbehaving voter, James, shares his knowledge with
the intruder, thus his behaviour is modelled with the renamed voter process
rVoter(), which allows the intruder to use his knowledge, whereas the honest
voters Alice and Bob are modelled using the honest voter model Voter(). How-
ever, the NSB channels can still be observed by the intruder, meaning that the
intruder acts passively on these channels.
rVoters1 =̂(Voter(Alice,Archimedes) ||| Voter(Bob,Babbage))
||| (rVoter(James,Archimedes) u rVoter(James,Babbage))
rVoters2 =̂(Voter(Alice,Babbage) ||| Voter(Bob,Archimedes))
||| (rVoter(James,Archimedes) u rVoter(James,Babbage))
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The systems are modelled in such a way that the intruder can see everything
James does, including his private messages, whilst Bob and Alice can vote freely
without any interception/blocking or spoofing. That is, although the intruder
can still overhear the public channels and inference from those messages, Alice
and Bob vote under the private and NSB channel assumptions.
The observational equivalence that is used for the analysis necessitates mask-
ing of the encrypted values in order to avoid false positive attacks, as the intruder
can distinguish two ciphertexts, even if he does not know the secret key—this
was not a case in the NSPK [NS78] analysis as the secrecy specification is differ-
ent from the anonymity used in this analysis. To this end, a masking function
maskFact is deployed. The function renames all messages encrypted under a
public key, whose corresponding secret key is not known by the voter, to a data
ciphertext and if the secret key is in the intruder’s initial knowledge, then he is
allowed to differentiate two ciphertexts by not masking them.
maskFact(Epk(m)) = if dual(pk) ∈ IK then Epk(m) else ciphertext
The masking function mask(P ) can also be defined for the processes, which masks
all encrypted facts of a given process, P , using the maskFact function for all the
data that appears in this process. (No keys are ever sent over the network, so
if the intruder does not know a secret key at the beginning, he will not learn it
later.)
mask(P ) =̂
P [[chnl.a.a
′.DigB(Ssk(s),maskFact(Epk(l)))/chnl.a.a′.DigB(Ssk(s),Epk(l))]]
[[chnl.a.a
′.Raw(s,maskFact(Epk(l)))/chnl.a.a′.Raw(s,Epk(l))]]
[[chnl.a.a
′.V(Ind.i,maskFact(Epk(l)))/chnl.a.a′.V(Ind.i,Epk(l))]]
where chnl ∈ {nsbcomm, take, fake}, the serial number s ∈ S, the candidate
list l ∈ L and the index value i ∈ I.
After applying the masking function to both System ′vVote and System
′′
vVote ,
they are ready for the analysis under the anonymity specification. To this end,
the anonymity requirement of this voting system model is checked with the
following trace equivalence in which the private channels are hidden.
mask(System ′vVote) \ {| scomm |} ≡T mask(System ′′vVote) \ {| scomm |}
FDR verifies that the two systems refine each other, meaning that they are trace
equivalent and hence that the intruder cannot distinguish them. As a result, the
vVote voting system model provides anonymity under the Dolev-Yao intruder
model.
5.1 Analysis under Alternative Assumptions
Although, the framework used in the previous section provides a firm compre-
hensive foundation for analysis of voting systems, it is also important to see
whether the framework supports further extensions to those assumptions made
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previously, because one of the important challenges in electronic voting systems
may be to maintain requirements even under the assumption of the corrupt
agents, for instance, misbehaving participants. Such analyses are possible with
slight modifications to the voting system and the intruder models. The following
paragraphs present two of these analyses of the vVote under different assump-
tions.
Corrupt POD Service The POD service is an important part of the print-
on-demand protocol. It receives raw ballot data including a serial number s and
candidate list encrypted under pkPS , and sends the digital ballot by signing the
serial number to the POD client. If the POD service is corrupt, which is modelled
as that the POD service’s secret is possessed by the intruder, the raw ballot
received by the POD service, say Raw(s3,EpkPS (Sq.〈Archimedes,Babbage〉)), can
be captured and decrypted by the intruder. Hence, the intruder can extract
the candidate list Sq.〈Archimedes,Babbage〉 and deduce its association with the
serial number s3. Following this, when he observes that Alice’s receipt with the
index value Ind.1 has the serial number s3 on it, he is then able to infer that Alice
has voted for the first candidate of the candidate list Sq.〈Archimedes,Babbage〉,
which is Archimedes. Therefore, the intruder distinguishes the two systems as
Alice cannot have voted for Babbage. This counter-example is produced by FDR
automatically and illustrated by the following partial trace.
〈. . .
nsbcomm.authority.wbb.Raw(s3, ciphertext),
nsbcomm.authority.podservice.Raw(s3,EpkPS (Sq.〈Archimedes,Babbage〉)),
nsbcomm.podservice.podclient.DigB(SskPS (s3), ciphertext),
enterBooth.Alice,
nsbcomm.Alice.ebm.Ind.1〉
It can be observed from the above trace that the intruder cannot decrypt the
ciphertext in the message sent from the authority to the WBB, as it is encrypted
under the authority’s public key pkEA, which is seen as ciphertext in the trace.
This scenario emphasises the importance of the single point failure in the
protocol security. In the real system, however, the POD service is thresholded,
meaning that all threshold parties, sign, encrypt or decrypt messages jointly,
without any party learning the ballot order. Therefore, the above would be a
threat against vVote, should all threshold parties collude.
Corrupt Authority A similar approach can be taken to model a corrupt elec-
tion authority, who leaks sensitive information that can be used by the intruder.
Since the authority is responsible for assigning random candidate lists to each
requested serial number from the ballot manager, the candidate list encrypted
under the authority’s public key will be revealed when he is corrupt. Therefore,
the intruder’s accurate deduction about the candidate lists would violate voter
anonymity by revealing the candidate list of a ballot form used by a particular
voter. The following trace produced by FDR demonstrates that when the author-
ity is compromised, which is modelled as the intruder knows his secret key skEA,
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the intruder violates Alice’s anonymity by deducing how she has voted. In more
detail, the intruder can overhear the candidate order Sq.〈Archimedes,Babbage〉
on Alice’s ballot form before she casts her vote. Once Alice indicates her prefer-
ence by the index value Ind.1, the chosen candidate, Archimedes, is revealed to
the intruder.
〈. . .
enterBooth.Alice
nsbcomm.authority.wbb.Raw(s1,EpkPS (Sq.〈Archimedes,Babbage〉)),
nsbcomm.authority.podservice.Raw(s1, ciphertext),
nsbcomm.podservice.podclient.DigB(SskPS (s1), ciphertext),
nsbcomm.Alice.ebm.Ind.1〉
Although no one is supposed to be observing voter interaction with the EBM,
it is assumed here that the index value Ind.i sent from voter to the EBM can be
observed, as it will be observed anyway once she takes her receipt from the receipt
printer. Thus, the two counter-examples above were found by FDR when the
intruder could observe these index values. If the intruder was not allowed to do
so, the counter-examples would still appear once the voter has taken her receipt
in a protocol run. Moreover, the two counter-example traces above include only
nsbcomm events, which illustrates that the intruder does not need to block or
spoof messages on those channels and hence a passive observer possessing the
corresponding secret keys would also be able to attack the system.
There are numerous corruption scenarios one can think of and that can be
modelled and analysed using this framework. In particular, the two presented
here emphasise the importance of the case of a corrupt single entity, such as
the election authority and POD service, where the voters are at a high risk of
losing their anonymity. The vVote voting system has a solution to these prob-
lems, to some extent, by having the ballot forms generated by the threshold
election authorities. However, if the other trusted entities, like the EBM, are
acting dishonestly, the system is vulnerable to various attacks. Additionally, it
was observed that a corrupt WBB does not reveal anything useful for the in-
truder to break the anonymity requirement of the system, because the WBB is
public anyway.
5.2 Secrecy Analysis using Lazy Spy
The lazy spy intruder model [RG97] was used to verify the authentication and
secrecy requirements of security protocols. In this analysis, a secret is defined
as the terms {AtoB,BtoA}, and the intruder model is defined so that when
the intruder learns one of the secrets in a protocol run, the process flags it up
using the channel intruderknows. When this event occurs in a protocol run,
the secret is not secret any more. Previously, in the anonymity requirement
analysis of vVote, this event was omitted because such an event was not needed
for the formal specification of this requirement. However, perhaps not for the
paper-based voting systems, where the voters are generally not required to use
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public key pairs to encrypt their votes, but especially in remote voting systems,
this specification can be used to verify whether the voting systems maintain the
secrecy of the votes. That is, it can be verified whether the intruder ever gets
to know a secret originated by a particular voter or any other agent. Moreover,
the secret data can be defined more specifically for each voting system, such as,
a candidate encrypted and cast by the voter as in the FOO scheme, in which a
voter encrypts her vote, blinds the encrypted version and sends it to the registrar.
To this end, the highlighted expression below is added to the intruder model to
flag up the intruder’s knowledge about a secret f from the set of secrets Banned.
Ignorantof (f ) =̂f ∈M& learn.f → Knows(f )2 infer?t ∈ {(X , f ′) | (X, f ′) ∈ D, f ′ = f} → Knows(f )
Knows(f ) =̂f ∈M& say.f → Knows(f )2 f ∈M& learn.f → Knows(f )2 infer?t ∈ {(X , f ′) | (X, f ′) ∈ D, f ∈ X} → Knows(f )2 f ∈ Banned & intruderknows.f → Knows(f)
Consequently, for the secrecy specification of a voting system, the following trace
refinement needs to be checked.
STOP vT System \ Σ 8 {| intruderknows |}
where Σ = {|nsbcomm, take, fake, intruderknows |}, the alphabet of the pro-
cess System.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In the beginning of modelling the intruder capabilities for voting systems, a need
for different channel types was mentioned. Regarding this, the need came out
when the model was initially analysed under the full Dolev-Yao intruder model
that can overhear, intercept and spoof any messages on all channels other than
the private channels. From this initial analysis, the following counter-example
was produced, which shows that with such an intruder the vVote voting system
is open to anonymity attacks, which verifies the observation made in [KR05]
about the FOO voting system.
〈. . .
scomm.podclient.Alice.B(Sq.〈Archimedes,Babbage〉,SskPS(s1), Ind.0),
comm.Alice.ebm.Ind.1,
scomm.podclient.Bob.B(Sq.〈Archimedes,Babbage〉,SskPS(s2), Ind.0),
comm.Bob.ebm.Ind.2,
closeElection,
comm.wbb.teller.V(Ind.2, ciphertext),
take.wbb.teller.V(Ind.1, ciphertext),
comm.teller.wbb.Archimedes.0〉
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What the intruder does in the counter example trace above is to block or in-
tercept with the channel take all the other votes except Bob’s. In this case,
Alice has voted for Archimedes with the index value Ind.1 and Bob has voted
for Babbage with Ind.2 on the private channels—the candidate orders on the
private channels scomm are hidden in the analysis and they are revealed here
just for illustration. Once the election is closed, tallying starts and the votes are
transferred from the WBB to the teller, the intruder intercepts the vote with
the index value Ind.1, and waits until Bob’s vote is counted. Having seen that
no one has voted for Archimedes, the intruder then deduces that Bob has voted
for Babbage. This is a genuine and generic attack—not only to vVote, but it is
applicable to any voting system. However, as it is not possible in a real system
that the intruder can block all votes but one, it was assumed in the analysis
that at least two honest votes are tallied at the end of the election. On the other
hand, the intruder works fully on James’ messages on the public and private
channels as if he votes in public.
Having modified the system with the adaptation of insecure NSB channels,
it was verified that the vVote voting system provides anonymity. This, together
with the corrupt agent scenarios, demonstrated that the abstract models and
formal definitions of requirements are adequate for the automatic verification
of voting system protocols. Additionally, it was shown that the active intruder
model modelled in this article is much more powerful in terms of mounting
various kinds of attacks than the passive attacker model used in the previous
analyses [MHS14, MHS15], which can only observe the messages on the public
channels.
Table 3 illustrates the verification times of the automated analysis of vVote
voting system based on the efficient models. In the table, the restricted Dolev-
Yao (D-Y) is the intruder model that is restricted to only a subset (James’s
communications) of all messages, whereby he can act as in the Dolev-Yao in-
truder model. The restriction is modelled with the existence of private and NSB
channels. Additionally, the full D-Y model is where the intruder can act mali-
ciously on all channels, but the private ones—voters’ privacy is still maintained.
However, the refinement does not hold, which necessitates the NSB channels in
the model. The restricted and full D-Y results cannot be compared with each
other, as the verification times vary depending on the voters’ being honest or
dishonest, they give some idea about how large a model FDR can handle before
state explosion for each test.
In this article, we have proposed an efficient and flexible formal approach
to modelling and analysis of cryptographic voting systems. In order to validate
the suitability of the framework, the vVote voting system was analysed against
an anonymity specification. To do so, an extensive number of other such rules
regarding voting systems have been defined. These enable the intruder to learn
and deduce further from his knowledge so as to able to use it to break the
protocol objectives. Moreover, we introduced special channel types, private and
NSB channels, in order to reason about voting systems under appropriate as-
sumptions, as it has been observed that no voting system model can provide
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Restricted D-Y Full D-Y
Refine States Time Refine States Time
3v 2c X 16, 063, 214 1h14m56s 2v 2c X 899, 494 1m45s
3v 3c − − − 2v 3c X 5, 040, 658 22m26s
4v 2c − − − 2v 4c − − −
4v 3c − − − 3v 2c − − −
Table 3: The FDR verification times for vVote. As the required state space grows
quickly with the number of voters and candidates, it was not possible to produce
results in some cases as FDR cannot handle with such huge states. Those are
denoted as “−” in the table.
anonymity under an unrestricted Dolev-Yao intruder model. The framework can
be applied to other voting systems providing that a CSP model of the system
that is compatible with the framework is produced, and system-specific deduc-
tion rules are given.
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Acronyms
AKISS Active Knowledge in Security Protocols.
AV alternative vote.
BM ballot manager.
CA Certificate Authority
CSP Communicating Sequential Processes.
DRE Direct Recording by Electronics.
EA election authority.
E2E end-to-end.
EBM electronic ballot marker.
FDR Failures-Divergence Refinement.
FPTP first-past-the-post.
InS insecure channel.
IRV instant-runoff voting.
NB no blocking.
NOH no overhearing.
NS no spoofing.
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NSB no spoofing and blocking.
NSPK Needham-Schroeder Public-Key.
POD print-on-demand.
PC print-on-demand client.
PS print-on-demand service.
RHS right hand side.
SBA short ballot assumption.
STV single transferable vote.
VEC Victorian Electoral Commission.
WBB web bulletin board.
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